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COMMENT
OIL AND GAS - UNITIZATION - Conservation of Oil and Gas
Resources - Greyhound Leasing & Finance Corp. v. Joiner
City Unit, 444 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1971).
INTRODUCTION
N 1953, an oil well was drilled in Carter County, Oklahoma
on a source measuring approximately 2 by 5/2 miles and
underlying 4,000 acres. Soon thereafter, numerous operators, in-
cluding Greyhound Leasing's predecessor in interest,' began tap-
ping the same source. In the ensuing years, as primary re-
covery 2 pressures were being depleted, the necessity of second-
ary recovery: operations became increasingly apparent. By 1961,
some operators began advocating unitization, 4 and, with Grey-
hound's predecessor participating, they initiated engineering
groundwork toward that goal. After negotiation, a unitization
plan was adopted and filed with the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission. In 1965, with approximately 95 wells producing
by primary recovery from the common source, a hearing was
conducted on the application. Greyhound Leasing insisted at
the hearing that its two producing wells not be included in
the unit, thereby maintaining the position their predecessor
held in prior negotiations. The Commission consequently
granted Greyhound's request, pursuant to a finding that sec-
ondary recovery by the unit would not adversely affect Grey-
hound Leasing.
In September 1965, shortly after approval of the unit,
1 Greyhound Leasing and Financial Corporation was the successor in
interest, by merger, of Boothe Leasing Corporation.
2Primary recovery: "[T]he oil, gas, or oil and gas recovered by any
method (natural flow or artificial lift) that may be employed to pro-
duce them through a bore; the fluid enters the well bore by the action
of native reservoir energy or gravity." AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
SECONDARY RECOVERY OF OIL IN THE UNITED STATES 255 (1942).
3 Secondary recovery: "Broadly defined, this term includes all methods
of oil extraction in which energy sources extrinsic, to the reservior are
utilized in the extraction." Index Vol., H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
OIL AND GAS LAW, Oil and Gas Terms 408 (1964). The method of sec-
ondary recovery used by Joiner City Unit was injection of salt water
into the formation through an input well, oil being removed from sur-
rounding wells.
" 'Unitization,' or, as it is sometimes described, 'unit operation,' means
the joint operation of all or some part of a producing reservoir. ...
The purpose of unitization is to permit the entire field (or a very sub-
stantial portion of it) to be operated as a single entity, without regard
to surface boundary lines." 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS
LAW §901 (1968).
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Joiner City Unit began injecting water over a mile from
Greyhound's nearest lease. Eleven months later, Greyhound
brought suit in federal district court to recover damages in-
curred as a result of injected water having displaced the oil
beneath its leases. The action was tried before a jury, and
Greyhound was awarded $529,844.52 in damages.5 On appeal
to the Tenth Circuit Court, the lower court's decision was
affirmed.
I. UNITIZATION IN OKLAHOMA
In a nation which literally runs on oil, proper conserva-
tion of the source of supply is of vital importance. As primary
oil and gas recovery pressures are tapped to the economic
limits of production, it is increasingly necessary to resort to
the use of effective secondary recovery methods in order to
obtain maximum oil recovery. To achieve this end, no fewer
than 22 states,6 including the vast majority of important oil
and gas producing states, with the notable exception of Texas,
have enacted statutes providing for compulsory unitization.
The Oklahoma statute, widely accepted as a model for
other compulsory unitization statutes,7 and perhaps the most
comprehensive on the subject,8 was designed to strike a fair
balance between the protection of traditional property rights
and the interests of conservation. Specifically, the statute was
enacted to regulate oil production "to the end that a greater
ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be had therefrom, waste
prevented, and the correlative rights of the owners in a fuller
and more beneficial enjoyment of the oil and gas rights,
protected."9
Under Oklahoma law the Corporation Commission is
charged with the regulation of all oil and gas production in
the state. It has broad powers to "do such things as may be
necessary or proper to carry out and effectuate the purposes
5 Damages were based on the difference between before and after re-
coverable reserves.
6 Ala., Alas., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., Ga., Kan., La., Mich., Miss.,
Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Utah, Wash. 6
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, § 912.
7 Id. § 912.3 at 103.
8 Id. § 912.3 at 102.
9 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.1 (1969). These same purposes are stated
in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 100-6-6,-22 (1963). Correlative rights:
"The opportunity afforded, so far as it is practicable to do so, to the
owner of each property in a pool too produce without waste his just and
equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool ... H. WILLIAMS
& C. MEYERS, supra note 3, at 93.
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of this Act."' 10 In the exercise of its police power, the Com-
mission may use the compulsory unitization provisions 1 of
the statute for owners on a common source. 12 Broad scope is
given the Commission to consider the fairest apportionment
formula,13 including the power to enlarge the unitized area
and to amend the plan of unitization.14 Specific provision also
exists for appeal of any order of the Commission to the Okla-
homa Supreme Court.'
5
The statute provides that any unit embracing less than
the whole of the common source of supply can be permitted by
the Commission:
[O]nly where it is shown by the evidence that the area to be
so included within the unit area is of such size and shape
as may be reasonably required for the successful and efficient
conduct of the unitized method or methods of operation for
which the unit is created, and that the conduct thereof will
have no material adverse effect upon the remainder of such
common source of supply.16
In a situation where the non-joiner has knowledge that
he is operating in the same pool with the unit and has had
adequate opportunity to participate in the unit, several options
are available to the courts. As the following discussion of each
alternative will reveal, no case law existed prior to Greyhound
Leasing directly on point to support any of the alternatives.
10 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.2 (1969). The Colorado counterpart
states "The commission shall have jurisdiction and authority over all
persons and property public and private necessary to enforce the pro-
visions of this article and shall have the power and authority to . . .do
whatever may reasonably be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this article." CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-6-5(1) (1963).
11OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4 (1969). In Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 100-6-16(5) (Supp. 1965).
12 Although none share the facts of Greyhound Leasing, numerous Okla-
homa decisions have given effect to the Unitization Act, holding it to be
a valid exercise of police power by the legislature and not violative of
section 23, article 2 of the State's constitution. West Edmond Hunton
Lime Unit v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 193 F.2d 818, (10th Cir. 1951);
Jones Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 382 P.2d 751 (Okla. 1963);
Woody v. State Corp. Comm'n, 265 P.2d 1102 (Okla. 1954); Spiers v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 206 Okla. 503, 244 P.2d 843 (1952); Palmer Oil
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 204 Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951).
13 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4 (1969). In Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 100-6-16 (4) (d) (Supp. 1965).
14 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.10. This provision has been subsequently
held constitutional. Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 206 Okla. 503,
244 P.2d 843 (1952); Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204
Okla. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951). The Colorado statutory counterpart is
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 100-6-16(6) (Supp. 1965).
15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.6 (1969). In Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 100-6-11 (1963) calls for appeal to the district courts.
If OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.4 (1969) (emphasis added). The Colo-
rado provision reads: "An order may provide for unit operations on less
than the whole of a pool where the unit area is of such size and shape
as may be reasonably required for that purpose, and the conduct thereof
will have no adverse effect upon other portions of the pool. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 100-6-16(8) (Supp. 1965).
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Legislative intent and public policy considerations, however,
loom large in deciding upon the proper solution.
II. THE DECISION IN GREYHOUND LEASING
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals limited itself to the
consideration of only two alternatives by restricting its inquiry
to two issues: (1) whether Oklahoma's modified private nui-
sance doctrine should have been applied; and (2) whether the
Corporation Commission's order resulted in immunity from lia-
bility to Joiner City Unit.1'7 The first question is framed so that
an affirmative answer would give full effect to the protection
of individual property rights while ignoring sound conservation
practices. In contrast, an affirmative answer to the second ques-
tion would give full scope to conservation interests while ignor-
ing property rights.
In considering the issue respecting the applicability of the
modified private nuisance doctrine, the court apparently viewed
the Oklahoma constitutional provision providing that "[n]o
private property shall be taken or damaged for private use ...
unless by consent of the owner" as being in conflict with the
conservation provisions of the Unitization Act.18 Oklahoma
court interpretations of this constitutional provision have re-
sulted in a strong flavor of strict liability in the application
of the private nuisance doctrine. To interpret Oklahoma's ap-
lication of this doctrine, the court in Greyhound relied heavily
on Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes.'9 In Gulf Oil the defendant was
held strictly liable for damages to plaintiff's water supply re-
sulting from defendant's use of "water flooding" in secondary
recovery of oil.2 0 Greyhound also made brief reference to other
17 444 F.2d 439, 441 (10th Cir. 1971).
18 In view of the weight placed on this constitutional provision by the
court, both the Oklahoma provision and its Colorado counterpart are
quoted here in full for purposes of comparison.
OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 23. "No private property shall be taken or
damaged for private use, with or without compensation, unless by con-
sent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, or for drains
and ditches across lands of others for agricultural, mining, or sanitary
purposes, in such manner as may be prescribod by law."
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 14. "Private property shall not be taken for
private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of
necessity, and except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or
across the lands of others, for agriculture, mining, milling, domestic
or sanitary purposes."
1, 371 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1962).
20 An earlier Oklahoma case, quoted by Gulf Oil Corp., was Fairfax Oil
Co. v. Bolinger, 186 Okla. 20, 97 P.2d 574 (1939). This was an action
based on damages from vibrations resulting from defendant's oil drilling
operation. The court held that, even though defendant's wells were
worked on in a lawful manner and without negligence, the effect of
section 23, article 2 of the constitution required that plaintiff recover
as for a nuisance in fact.
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Oklahoma cases considering the private nuisance doctrine, 21 but
the court ended argument on the question by further reference
to Gulf Oil:
We must take the decisional law prevailing in Oklahoma to be
as expressed in the opinion in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes ....
This rule should be applied to the somewhat different facts
before us unless these differences provide some substantial
reason to the contrary. We find that differences do not provide
such a reason.
22
Thus, the court held the modified nuisance doctrine applicable,
and that salt water intrusion was a nuisance per se under state
decisions.
It appears that the court stretched the rule of stare decisis
by applying Gulf Oil's strict liability holding to the signifi-
cantly different circumstances found in Greyhound Leasing.
Since the injury was to a water supply, unitization legislation
was immaterial to the facts of Gulf Oil. Under the facts of
Greyhound Leasing, however, the unitization statute clearly
requires that conservation interests be balanced with property
rights. Previous Oklahoma decisions have found no con-
flict between this statute and constitutional private property
protections.
23
In considering the second issue of whether the Corporation
Commission's order resulted in immunity to Joiner City Unit,
the court gave a negative response to the argument urged by
the defendants. Joiner City Unit argued that the Commis-
sioner's order irrevocably fixed the rights of all parties on the
common source allowing Greyhound Leasing no recovery. It
was a-serted that Greyhound Leasing was completely aware
of the circumstances and had full opportunity to participate in
the unit. The defense concluded that, by refusing to participate,
Greyhound Leasing assumed the risk of remaining outside the
unit and was therefore estopped from asserting any claim if
the risk yielded unfavorable results.
The court acknowledged that the Commission specifically
retained jurisdiction and admitted that the Commission's exer-
21 West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard, 265 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1954);
West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 204 Okla. 9, 226
P.2d 965 (1950); Larkins-Warr Trust v. Watchorn Petroleum Co., 198
Okla. 12, 174 P.2d 589 (1946); British-American Oil Producing Co. v.
McClain, 191 Okla. 40, 126 P.2d 530 (1942). Like Gulf Oil Corp. and
Fairfax Oil Co., however, none of these cases involved a contest over
prevention of waste or correlative rights in a common source of supply
as previously determined by the Corporation Commission. Rather, they
were cases which were primarily exercises in the application of the
state's private nuisance doctrine.
22444 F.2d 439, 442 (10th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
23 See cases cited note 12 supra.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
cise of police power was valid under Oklahoma law. 24 The
court also pointed out that no attempt had been made to com-
pel plaintiff's participation in the unit, and that the Commis-
sion had approved unitization of all of a common source except
for Greyhound's leases. The court then proceeded to explain
that:
[I]t does not follow that the Commission thereby somehow
permitted the Unit operations on their authority to extend
with the Commission's blessing to the portion not unitized as
defendant infers. The tracts of plaintiff simply were not uni-
tized nor reclassified, and this is clearly permitted under the
statute. These tracts were thus in no different position relative
to regulation than they were before the hearing.
25
Despite the fact that Greyhound was on notice of the unit
operation, it could have taken no precautionary measures to
avoid the flooding of its wells and had every right to full
enjoyment of property rights in the absence of the Commis-
sion's exercise of compulsory unitization provisions. Conse-
quently, the court found no Joiner City Unit immunity as a
result of the Commission's order. It also found no Oklahoma
authority to preclude the hearing of a cause of action for dam-
ages by a court 26 and upheld the trial court's ruling that:
"[A] s a matter of law . . . the plaintiff need not have resorted
to administrative relief before the Oklahoma Corporation Com-
mission before commencing the legal proceedings.
'2
The court's second question was framed so as to yield an
all or nothing answer. Had the court chosen this alternative,
holding Joiner City Unit "immune," a non-joiner's right to
remain independent would be reduced to a gamble. To allow
plaintiff no remedy in these circumstances would in effect
coerce unitization in complete disregard for individual property
rights.
On the other hand, the court, in finding no Joiner City
Unit "immunity" and in denying further administrative action
by holding Joiner City Unit strictly liable for its operation,
serves to discourage would-be joiners from unit operation in
complete disregard for conservation of oil resources. From a
public policy standpoint, the long-range effect of this decision
will not only be detrimental to conservation interests because
of delays in unitization, but will be detrimental to the protec-
tion of property rights as well. Here the plaintiff is allowed
24 444 F.2d 439, 443 (10th Cir. 1971).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
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to have his cake and eat it too. He may take the highly favor-
able risk that he will derive a benefit from water flooding
operations of the unit (without sharing in the costs) with the
assurance that, should his gamble fail, he may still recover any
loss in court. Here the non-joiner's gamble is always to the
detriment of the leaseholders of the unit who are not only
operating in strict conformity with the law but are doing so
in conformity with the directives of a government agency
whose duty is to oversee such operations. This clearly avoids
a proper accounting of the conservation interests found under
the statute.
28
III. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
As already indicated, given the two basic purposes of pro-
tection of property rights and conservation interests, it is obvi-
ous that in an action concerning unit operation a court may
chose between three alternatives. The court may (1) give
overriding protection to property rights at the expense of sound
conservation practices, (2) protect the interests of conservation
at the expense of property rights, or (3) strike a balance be-
tween property rights and conservation interests.
The more viable alternative, and the only one giving proper
recognition to both the prevention of waste and the full protec-
tion of individual property rights, is for the court to require the
non-joiner to initially seek relief before the Commission, rather
than before the court, for a reformation of the unit and a reap-
portionment of production profits, with a right of appeal to
the state courts. In Oklahoma, this would presently require
the state court to overturn Greyhound Leasing's interpretation
of the statute, recognizing that the statute requires a rehearing
of the matter before the Commission. 29 While case law on this
point is virtually nonexistent, similar cases considered together
seem to support this alternative. 30  Moreover, the provisions
28 See material cited note 9 supra.
29 As a practical matter, to insure the obvious intent of the statute the
state legislature should amend its Unitization Act to specifically cover
this situation.
30 In Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Stott, 159 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1947),
the dispute was between lessor and lessee and consequently did not
involve protection of correlative rights (see note 9 supra). However,
the decision is reflective of the public policy against waste and the facts
are so similar to Greyhound Leasing as to be of some guidance. Here
defendant lessees participated in a unit recovering gas by injection
of dry gas to force recovery of the more valuable wet gas. Certain les-
sors who had refused to join the unit brought suit against their lessees
for failing to protect against the displacement of wet gas under their
properties. The court found defendants not liable because the non-
consenting lessors had been given an opportunity to participate in the
unit. The more recent case of California Co. v. Britt, 247 Miss. 718, 154
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of Oklahoma's Unitization Act seem to require this result,31
despite the Greyhound Leasing interpretation.
The court correctly stated that since plaintiff's leases were
not included in the unit, the tracts were in no different position
relative to the regulation than they were before the hearing.
32
What the court failed to recognize was that once plaintiff's
wells were flooded, the Commission's finding that the unit
would not adversely affect other owners in the common source
was no longer a valid assumption upon which to base the mem-
bership of the unit, and that further proceedings before the
Commission were necessary to properly account for the changed
circumstances.
Keeping in mind that the Commission has the power to
enlarge the unit 33 and to do what is necessary to further the
purposes of the Act,34 it is submitted that the Commission has
the power to include the plaintiff in the unit, assigning him
his proportionate share of the income from the time his wells
were flooded less his share of the secondary recovery costs.
For those who would argue that this allows the plaintiff the
same "have your cake and eat it too" advantage of the first
alternative, the Commission could and should additionally
charge plaintiff his pro rata share of secondary recovery costs
prior to the flooding of his wells for any benefit the Commis-
sion finds plaintiff enjoyed at the unit's expense.
CONCLUSION
In 1965 more than 30 percent of the nation's total output of
oil was produced by secondary recovery operations. 35 As the de-
pletion of primary recovery pressures continues, the use of
secondary recovery methods assumes ever-growing importance.
Given the complicated nature of ownership rights to oil and gas
it is obvious that adequate conservation measures may be
So. 2d 144 (1963), concerned a dispute between cotenants with essen-
tially the same fact pattern found in Stott. Here the court also found no
liability because the plan had been approved by the conservation agency
and plaintiff had been given an opportunity to join the unit.
31 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 287.1 to 287.15 (1969). The Colorado coun-
terpart is the Oil and Gas Conservation Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 100-6-1 to -22 (1963).
32 444 F.2d 439, 443 (10th Cir. 1971).
33 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.10 (1969) ; Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 206 Okla. 503, 244 P.2d 843 (1952). In Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 100-6-16(6) (Supp. 1965).
34 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.2 (1969). Colorado provisions quoted
note 10 supra.
3 5 Lynch, Liability for Secondary Recovery Operations, TWENTY-SECOND
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 37, 38 (1971).
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achieved only through the enactment and enforcement of effec-
tive legislation.
The Oklahoma statute requires prevention of waste of oil
and gas resources to derive the maximum benefit therefrom.
It also requires the balancing of conservation interests with the
correlative rights of all property owners (including lease-
holders) on any common source of supply. The same statute
gives the necessary authority to the Corporation Commission
to achieve and maintain this balance.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision providing a
"heads-I-win-tails-you-lose" remedy for the nonjoining lease-
holder is certain to cause many would-be participants in unit
operations to be more cautious about unitization. When unitiza-
tion does take place, greater effort will be directed toward
compulsory unitization. The net result will be to delay unitiza-
tion and to afford less freedom to the would-be nonjoiner by
compelling his participation. Hence, the court's efforts to pro-
tect the private property owner could well be self-defeating.
Where a changed circumstance occurs after issuance of a
unitization order as in Greyhound Leasing, it is urged that the
damaged party should first be required to seek rehearing before
the Commission. This solution gives full scope to the Com-
mission's fact-finding role as intended by the legislature.36
Where the facts complicate the issues, agencies such as the
Corporation Commission are better equipped to determine the
facts and equitably resolve the issues than courts prone to
render "all or nothing" judgments as in Greyhound Leasing,
largely at the behest of the parties.
In view of the growing importance of secondary recovery
and the similarity between Oklahoma and Colorado law, this
decision would seem to call for thoughtful consideration among
Colorado attorneys concerned with oil and gas law. It is urged
that under the circumstances of Greyhound Leasing, where a
significant circumstance changes after issuance of the unitiza-
tion order, the alternative requiring a damaged party to seek
rehearing before the Commission is by far the preferable
choice.
Douglas R. Nichols
3 The legislative intent was clearly expressed in the purposes of the act.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 287.1 (1969). In Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 100-6-6, .-22 (1963).

